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Abstract 
 The Northern Caucasus has been a troubled region for the Russian Federation for nearly 
two decades.  In the 1990s, two wars took place in Chechnya and violence spread into the 
neighboring republics of Ingushetia and Dagestan.  Since the end of the second Chechen conflict 
in 2002, blossoming insurgencies have begun in both republics, threatening the stability of the 
entire Northern Caucasus.  This study analyzes the origins of the insurgencies using the 
contemporary scholarly findings on internal conflict as they relate to the two republics. 
Economic conditions, political repression, factors related to diverse ethnic makeup of the 
republics, as well as  the spillover effect are examined in the study to address the spread of 
insurgent violence within Ingushetia and Dagestan in an attempt to assist in the development of 
better government policies. 
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Introduction 
 In 2010, “the number of terror acts committed in the Northern Caucasus Federal District 
(NCFD) went up by 100 percent… As a result of such attacks, 218 persons were lost and 536 
more were wounded,” stated Ivan Sydoruk, Deputy General Public Prosecutor of Russia 
(Marzoeva, 2010). The NCFD referred to by Mr. Sydoruk in his statement encompasses the 
following federal units of Russia: Chechnya, Ingushetia, Dagestan, Karachaevo-Cherkessia, 
Kabardino-Balkaria, Stavropol Kray, Krasnodar Kray, Adygeya and North Ossetia.  However, 
estimates of the magnitude of violence in the NCFD vary across different sources due to the 
difficulties with obtaining data on casualties within the region as well as differences in the 
estimation methods (Musaev, 2010).  O’Louglin and Witmer (2010), for example, gathered a 
total of 14,177 violent events within the Northern Caucasus republics from 1999-2007.  The 
region has seen a very serious uptick in violence over the last two decades and many believe that 
the problem is only getting worse.   
 This research seeks to explain the proliferation of violence throughout the Northern 
Caucasus.  More specifically, the question I ask in this thesis is as follows, what are the factors 
that contribute to the spread of violence in the Northern Caucasus?  The goals of this research are 
to identify conditions that favor  the spread of violence in the region and to conjecture about how 
this knowledge can be used in devising and implementing effective policies for the NCFD region 
as a whole, or within its respective republics. Very little research has focused on explaining 
violence in other republics within the region, unless this violence has been somehow related to  
the two Chechen conflicts.  Furthermore, most research on political violence has been carried out 
at either the federal level or at the level of the individual subjects of the federation, usually, 
Chechnya, at the expense of the regional lens of analysis and regional context.  The importance 
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of this research cannot be understated for the academic community. The sheer number of 
casualties from violent attacks, displaced persons due to political instability, economic 
difficulties and the possibility of further spread of violence into other territories call for a 
systematic analysis of the factors contributing to the spread of violence in the North Caucasus.  
 The spread of insurgent violence will be analyzed using an empirical case study of the 
republics Dagestan and Ingushetia. The study of these two republics will determine if the 
violence has been the result of the spillover of conflict from one conflict zone (Chechnya) to 
others  or whether the violence is the result of different factors within each republic respectively.  
To accomplish this, I begin with a review of the existing literature on insurgency and conflict 
that will provide basis for defining the key concepts used in the study and deriving tentative 
explanations to the puzzle identified above. Next, I discuss the research design and methods of 
the study as well as its hypotheses.  The following four sections will test the economic, political, 
ethnic and spillover hypotheses.  The economic and political sections will focus on the time 
period of 2001-2008.  Meanwhile, the ethnicity and spillover sections will intermix historical 
perspectives with contemporary information up to 2008.  In conclusion, the final section will 
discuss the implications of the study, the limitations of the research and prospects for future 
studies. 
Existing Social Explanations of Civil Wars and Insurgencies 
 The scholarly literature on the factors for insurgent warfare and the “spillover” effects of 
such conflict is both robust and intricate.  Insurgents, or insurgent groups, are rebellious forces 
that do not possess the international personality of a rebel belligerent (Glahn & Taulbee, 2010). 
This part of the thesis focuses on the discussion of the explanations  of such warfare suggested in 
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the scholarship on insurgencies and civil wars.  Insurgencies combat state forces using guerilla 
and terror tactics because they have smaller numbers, lower financial capital and they are 
attempting to defeat a better funded and heavily armed national force (Galula, 1964).  A 
straightforward and operational reasoning as to why certain groups choose insurgency as an 
outlet for expressing their discontent is that these groups are weaker, cheaper and are unbound by 
the institutional responsibilities of a government (1964).  The literature on the subject identifies a 
wide variety of sources of the group’s discontent leading to an insurgency that can be generally 
classified into three clusters (these categories are not exhaustive).  Scholars believe that an 
insurgency is the result of socio-economic, socio-political and ethnic factors. This is to the 
discussion of these factors that I will turn next. 
Socio-Economic Conditions for Instability  
 .  Material incentives and economic inequality are identified as two potential root 
economic factors for an insurgency.  Although, economic factors for insurgencies are extremely 
diverse, each factor can be operationalized at either the state or individual level.Paul Collier, in 
his scholarly works and his book The Bottom Billion, has noted the link between guerilla 
movements, internal conflict and “loot-seeking” at the individual level (Collier & Hoeffler, 1999; 
Collier, 2007).  He is not the only scholar to recognize the link between movable (production, 
funds, etc.) and immoveable (mines, oil, etc.) assets and the opposing forces trying to obtain 
them (Bansal, 2008; Boix, 2008). However, his seminal work gave rise to an economic 
explanation of  internal armed conflict connecting it to a feeling of  opportunism by rebel or 
insurgent forces who seek economic gains (Collier & Hoeffler, 2004).  A country’s population, 
both wealthy as well as poor, has an equal desire to control scarce or limited resources for 
personal and communal benefit, which could lead to direct conflict (Boix, 2008).  Ultimately, 
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financial incentives and a rebellion’s costs are believed to be primary variables for both groups 
in Collier’s work, with grievances being statistically negligible in his research (Collier & 
Hoeffler, 2004; Collier, 2007). “But the grievances that motivate rebels may be substantially 
disconnected from the large social concerns of inequality, political rights, and ethnic or religious 
identity “ (Collier & Hoeffler, 2004).  War profiteering, as some would argue, is not the prime 
motivation for internal armed conflict and the true origins of this conflict lies in the financial 
conditions of the country as a whole.   
 Poverty and conditions surrounding the economic environment of a region are referred to 
as being a leading grievance for insurgents.  A correlation between income levels and 
“revolutionary events” does exist and appears to be inversely related (Boix, 2008).  However, 
separating the “objective” measures of poverty from the real, or perceived, inequalities of an 
economic system that depend on a variety of ideational factors and values would be inaccurate 
according to the literature. The income inequalities of certain regions may breed discontent 
among local populations, thus fueling the potential for internal rebellion (Muller & Seligson, 
1987).  Similarly, poverty stemming from economic isolationism or deprivation breeds 
grievances against the more prosperous parties (Bansal, 2008).  Again, poverty is not a 
determining variable of an insurgency movement but the economic and social issues stemming 
from poverty increase the likelihood of an insurgency.  For example, governments or other 
intervening forces can perpetuate inequality by promoting, or are perceived as promoting, 
exploitative economic policies that deprive local populations of natural resources, human capital 
and the public services much like in Balochistan or Iraq (2008).    
 Iraq is one such country that has witnessed the increase in the economically 
disadvantaged due to the removal of the previous ruling power (Hashim, 2006).  The country’s 
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fiscal health and industrial infrastructure suffered as a result of US-led military operation 
contributing to the loss in publicly funded services such as law and order, which has also 
contributed to the unemployment of the country (2006).  Government institutions in relatively 
wealthy countries seek to provide assistance to the citizens of its country in the form of 
employment, higher incomes and societal security.  If the government cannot provide for the 
citizens then they have broken the contract between a government and its people.  In Iraq, the 
loss of economic privilege and opportunity because of the coalition’s occupation has had a 
serious “material and psychological” impact on segments of the Iraqi population which has 
helped create a population that was willing to give material and personal support to an 
insurgency movement (2006).  Many of the men that joined the insurgency were members of the 
former Ba’th party and military officers whom lost their salaries and were forced to make 
meager livings elsewhere (2006).  This proved to be an embarrassment to many members of the 
community and fomented feelings of revenge (2006).  The Iraqi government and coalition forces 
could no longer care for the people, thus individuals began joining the insurgency movement for 
a paycheck.  This also indicates that countries with ailing economies also tend to be weaker 
states that cannot provide basic tangible (water, electricity, forms of media, military, etc.) and 
intangible (law and order, social services, etc.) support for their citizens (Collier, 2007). 
 Furthermore, the degradation of local bureaucracy and weakening of the state institutions 
will “play into the hands of the insurgency” (Gaula, 1964).  Collier and Hoeffler (2004) believe 
that well-funded and competent governments are better equipped to prevent an insurgency. This 
is especially the case when government bureaucracies fail to maintain or implement outlets for 
substantial development among young (15-24) males (Collier & Hoeffler, 1999).  This lack of 
development allows for the process of politics to be shaped by ideology, resources and identity 
 
 
11 
(Hashim, 2006).  In the presence of a political vacuum or political instability these forces take 
the place of the government’s original social support.    
Political Conditions for Insurgent Violence   
The social support provided by governments cannot be separated from the political atmosphere 
from which they originate.  “Most of the insurgencies are an outcome of a deep dissatisfaction 
and disappointment with the given political and social reality” (Javed, 2010, p. 8).  This political 
opposition can arise out of colonial occupation, the existing social order, or the ruling 
government system (2010).  Politically motivated groups or individuals often feel alienated by 
failed or corrupted practices of the state or state officials.  This leads to a very real sense of 
marginalization within a group or groups who wish to address their grievance or grievances 
through the implementation of insurgency as a platform to address their perceived injustices 
(Muller & Seligson, 1987; Hashim, 2006, Javed, 2010). This explanation appears to conflict with 
Collier’s assessment of loot seeking in war versus grievances, however, grievances alone do not 
cause conflict and instead breed conditions for conflict.  Egypt is one such secular country “in 
which Islamist groups have been marginalized in the political process” (Fielding & Shortland, 
2010).  Without delving too deep into the history of the Egyptian insurgency, a correlation can be 
found between the onset of political violence, political repression and opposing spectrums of 
government systems (Muller & Seligson, 1987; Fielding & Shortland, 2010).   
 Insurgency, after all, is a form of organized political violence and local political climates 
should be weighed accordingly.  The extremes of the political spectrum “democratic” and 
“repressive” regimes have a propensity to prevent dissident groups from ever forming because of 
their conflict resolution capabilities (Muller & Seligson, 1987).  Extremely repressive regimes 
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can effectively quell any form of opposition through decreed restrictions and “open” societies 
allow for opposition to be heard, which makes the benefits of seeking violent means of redress 
impractical, each decrease the likelihood of overt violent dissent (1987).  As stated above, quasi-
democratic governments or transitioning democracies suffer the effects of political violence 
more frequently due to the propensity of discontented members of society (1987).  This is a 
tenuous balance between the government and society because of potential reactionary policies 
(mass arrests, invade religious sights, home invasions, group removal from political discourse, 
etc.) that prove divisive for certain portions of the population (Fielding & Shortland, 2010).   
Ethnic Divisions as a Factor of Violence   
 Ethnic divisions can be considered one of the more contentious topics while discussing 
the causes of an insurgency.  “If many post-1945 civil wars have been ‘ethnic or ‘nationalist’ as 
these terms are usually understood, then even more have been fought as insurgencies” (Fearon & 
Laitin, 2003).  However, academics contest the direct role of ethnicity as it relates to internal 
conflict (Fearon & Laitin, 2003; Collier, 2001).  Collier’s research indicates that ethnicity or 
religiously connected ethnicity performs more of a complimentary pattern to internal conflict 
rather than causing the conflict itself (Collier, 2001).  Similarly, Fearon and Laitin (2003) 
research indicates that a “greater degree” of ethnic diversity does not increase the likelihood of 
civil war on its own.  Rather, ethnic conflict, in conjunction with mitigating factors, is believed 
to be both economic and political in origin (Figueiredo & Weingast, 1999).  Quantitative studies 
focusing on these links have statistically concluded that the ethnic factor within civil conflict is a 
nearly irrelevant variable (Lyall, 2008).  
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 “Qualitative studies, however, have largely drawn the opposite conclusion, arguing that 
ethnic cleavages determine the nature of insurgent violence” (Lyall, 2008).  Studies have shown 
that civil wars involving indigenous populations last longer than other related “regime unrest” 
(Buhaug & Gleitsch, 2008).  The potential marginalization of indigenous or other ethnic groups 
within societies has a tendency to spread discord throughout the very fabric of the social 
structure (Fielding & Shortland, 2010).  This marginalization can arise from, previously 
mentioned, pseudo-democratic structures and heavy-handed counter-insurgency tactics (2010).  
Members of disgruntled groups may ultimately come to the conclusion that violence is needed to 
publicly promote a political cause (2010).  Also, the leader of such ethnic groups is a large 
contributor, as the potential leader of ethnic identity, to the promotion of such means of redress 
(Hashim, 2006; Figuerido & Weingast, 1999). 
 Ethnic identity, or ethnic membership, “facilitates group formation” leading to potential 
ethnic cleavages within a government (Mishali-Ram, 2008).  This is witnessed in the lack of 
government formation within Afghanistan and the Sunni “identity crisis” within Iraq (Hashim, 
2006; Mishali-Ram, 2008).  An ethnic identity is hard to quantify and is an intangible factor, but 
it is considered key to understanding the underlying motivations of the Iraqi insurgency (Hashim, 
2006).  Likewise, a crisis in identity for the Balochistani people within Balochistan is considered 
a contributing factor for government resentment in the region (Bansal, 2008).  Foreign 
occupation, refugee migration and deep ideological divisions are believed to contribute to the 
“identity crisis” of some ethnic insurgencies (Bansal, 2008; Mishali-Ram, 2008; Hashim, 2006).    
Spillover of Conflict 
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 The rise in internal armed conflict after the end of World War II has both shocked and 
puzzled academia for the better part of a century.  One puzzling aspect of internal wars is 
whether or not they have a significant spillover effect into neighboring areas.  One reasoning as 
to why conflict appears to be contagious is that the “spatial clustering” of conflicts often is a 
result of the inherent similarities within a given region (Buhaug & Gleditsch, 2008). Regime 
type, economic similarities and ethnic  cohesion  contribute to the spillover effect, but only a 
combination of these factors seems to explain the spatial clustering (2008). “Moreover, we find 
that contagion effects are primarily associated with separatist conflicts” (2008).  This is possibly 
due to transnational ethnic ties and their contribution to the group’s agenda (2008).  ‘Spatial 
clustering’ may contribute to the appearance of conflict as a contagion, but the economic impact 
on the surrounding region is hard to deny.  
 “Both the death rate and the duration of the conflict influence the extent of the negative 
neighbor spillovers on short-run growth” (Murdoch & Sandler, 2002).  Murdoch and Sandler 
(2002) emphasize the fact that a nation “must” establish faster economic growth in order for it to 
recover from the negative effects and to prevent regional spillover.  Landlocked countries and 
countries with “longer contiguous borders with nations at war” are particularly prone to the 
economic consequences of the conflict (Collier, 2007; Murdoch & Sandler, 2002).  Similar 
studies have been done to address the financial and social impact of refugees on insurgency 
movements but have found a minimal correlation (Leenders, 2008). 
A Brief History of the Northern Caucasus 
 The Persians, Mongols, Ottomans, Savavids and Russians have all shared, historically, 
similar confrontations with the peoples of the Northern Caucasus.  The Caucasus region is 
 
 
15 
considered the gateway between the Near East and the Eurasian steppe and was considered 
irresistible to the predominant empires of the passing centuries (Ware and Kisriev 2010).  The 
last great empire to extend their territorial ambitions Southward was imperial Russia.  Russia 
claimed territorial control over the region of the North Caucasus in the early 1800’s.   
 The amount of territorial “control” Russia exercised over the mountain clans was another 
matter all together.   Highland raiders often sought to loot or destroy Russian convoys moving 
throughout the region, however “by 1818 there was a widespread revolt against the ruthless 
tactics of the Russian… General Aleksey Petrovich Yermolov (Ware and Kisriev 2010, p.15).”  
Although, the revolt originated from Russia’s policies of implementing nontraditional autocratic 
administrative structures that were not consistent with the customs of the mountain clan structure 
(2010).  The Russians sought policies that divided the people of the North Caucasus along 
artificial ethnic distinctions, all the while promoting a policy of systematic resettlement to the 
Northern plains (Ware and Kisriev 2010, Stone 2006).  The division of the populations also 
meant the establishment of a local aristocracy to promote Russian interests, but the new 
aristocracy created discontentment among the local populations due to increasing amounts of 
political repression and economic inequalities (Ware and Kisriev 2010).  This led to the 
formation of a new Sufi ideology, which emphasized “liberation and self-determination” (2010, 
p.17).  The North Caucasus remained in a state of rebellion for a large part of the 19th century, 
but the Russian Empire found limited success by maintaining military rule over the region until 
the rise of the Soviet Union.   
 In the early 20th century, the Soviet Union was busy consolidating power after the 
Russian Civil War.  For the exception of multi-ethnic Dagestan, the North Caucasus region was 
divided, into eight republics and districts, along “national” lines due to economic, administrative 
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and security concerns (Ware and Kisriev 2010).  The establishment of ethnic identity in the 
region was due to Soviet programs for cultural development and the implementation of ethno-
national organizations (2010).  The most traumatic event for the peoples of the North Caucasus, 
under Soviet rule, was at the outbreak of WWII. An estimated 2.05 million people were removed 
from their native homelands in the Northern Caucasus and the instituted policy of “toponomic 
repression” eliminated historical elements of cultural heritage, such as names of towns and 
cultural artifacts (Polian 2004).  Boundary lines were, again, artificially redrawn and new, 
Russian names were given to towns and other ethnic landmarks (2004).   The policy was 
introduced to deal with the “traitorous” races that fought for Germany in WWII, but the fact of 
the matter is that many of these deportations occurred while members of these ethnicities had 
been fighting for the Soviet Union (Thus combating the notion of historically defiant ethnicities; 
Polian 2004).  In the early 1950’s and 1990’s, the ethnicities affected by the deportations 
(Chechens, Ingushetians, Kalmyks, Karachai, Balkars) were allowed to return to their homeland.  
This return combined with the collapse of the Soviet Union set the stage for an increase in 
hostilities that has lasted until the present. 
 When the Soviet Union collapsed, the economy, social/ideological structure and the 
military of Russia collapsed.  Indeed, the collapse of the three vital structures was inevitable 
because of their intimate intertwining in Soviet ideology (Odom 1998).  When the collapse 
occurred, an ideological/power vacuum swept through the states of the Soviet Union and 
threatened to destabilize the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic (RSFSR).  In the North 
Caucasus, the effects of the tsarist and soviet ethnic distinctions, combined with the continual 
redefinition of administrative boundaries, created serious problems for the newly established 
Russian Federation (Hunter 2004; Ware and Kisriev 2010).  “Various ethnic groups of the 
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RSFSR began asserting claims of national and cultural self-determination,” which also included 
ethnic Russian regions as well (Hunter 2004; p. 213).  However, the most notorious instance of 
self-determination was the declaration of sovereignty by the Chechen Republic of Ichkeria. 
 Following the Chechen declaration of independence in 1993, two Chechen Wars erupted 
both differing in causality, ferocity and regional impact.  The chronological events of the First 
Chechen war are a litany of horrors that will not be delved into in this analysis, but four 
conclusions can be drawn from the war: 1) The death of civilians allowed for the Chechen 
insurgency to fight an effective information war; 2) The accidental deaths and murder of 
civilians drove the Chechens (i.e. Shamil Basayev in the Buddyonovsk hospital) to seek 
extremist measures to achieve their objective of independence; 3) Widespread corruption 
permitted the insurgency to gather weapons and ammunition from the Russian army; 4) Though 
not every Chechen supported independence or President Dudayev, they feared the Russians most 
of all (Gall & de Waal, 1998).  The Second Chechen War, later re-labeled as the 
counterterrorism operation, has been described as a continuation of the first, though largely 
amplified with greater regional consequences.  Likewise, the conclusions that are drawn from the 
first war are considered identifiers for the greater spread of insurgent conflict in the Northern 
Caucasus as a whole. 
 The literature that exists on the diffusion of violence from Chechnya to the broader  
Northern Caucasus often contain a very broad geopolitical analysis (Vendina, Belozerov & 
Gustafson, 2007).  Also, the analyses often focus on the broader impact of the Chechen Wars, 
and its aftermath, on the region as a whole, rather than analyzing the individual republics and 
how their socio-political or economic conditions contributed to the escalation of  violence. The 
summaries that are given for the individual autonomous regions are often referenced as footnotes 
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or general comments rather than comprehensive studies of the internal environment in which the 
conflict is taking place.  A more thorough investigation into the socio-political, socio-economic 
and ethnic environments of the republics of Dagestan or Ingushetia will hopefully shed light on 
the perpetuation of violence of the Northern Caucasus. 
 Speculation exists as to whether or not the insurgencies in the territories bordering 
Chechnya are the consequences of  spillover of violence from the Chechen republic or whether 
the Chechen wars merely served as a catalyst for the underlying social issues of the individual 
republics to explode into political violence (Vendina, Belozerov, & Gustafson, 2007; 
O’Loughlin, 2010). Below, I lay out a research design to carry out an assessment of the impact of 
three groups of underlying factors: (1) ethnic and religious divisions; (2) political conditions; and 
(3) economic factors (particularly, economic degradation) on the rise of insurgent violence in the 
NCFD. I will also test for the possibility of spillover effect of the conflict from Chechnya. 
Research Design and Methodologys 
Time Frame 
 The time frame of the case study will primarily cover statistics and events up to the year 
2008.  The economic and political sections will focus on the time period of 2001-2008.  
Meanwhile, the ethnicity and spillover sections will intertwine historical perspectives with 
contemporary information up to 2008.  The complexity of both ethnicity and spillover sections 
requires historical background on the subject matter as well as events occurring during and after 
the Second Chechen conflict, to assist in the understanding of a conflict, which has persisted to 
the present. 
Defining “Violence” 
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 Important conceptual definitions frame the research of the spreading violence in the 
Northern Caucasus.  The general definition of “violence” does not differentiate between common 
criminality and organized social and political violence.  Therefore, violence will be defined as 
actions involving the use of force or threats to use force by insurgents that is directed toward 
civilian and military targets, such as the public, their property, businesses, industrial enterprises, 
military personnel, military installations, political figures, and others,  in an attempt to enact a 
political action/reaction by the government (O’Loughlin & Witmer, 2010, Kulikov, 2003). The 
definition, as it is used in this paper, also distances itself from conventional forms of criminality.  
The examples of violent actions, or the use of force, will reference assassinations, bombings 
(suicide bombings, mines, grenades, etc.), ambushes, and hostage taking, among others 
(Kulikov, 2003).  The term terrorism will not be used in this study because current definitions of 
terrorism lack consensus, thus detracting from the research, and is also much narrower than the 
types of violence committed by insurgents. 
 For that purpose, the Russian definition of terrorism and terrorist acts will not be used in 
the research because of their inherent ambiguity in addressing the violence in the Northern 
Caucasus. However, there is a need to reference the Russian definition of terrorism to present the 
Russian legal conception of insurgent violence in the Northern Caucasus. The Russian legal 
definition of terrorism is: 
 The ideology of violence and the practice of influencing the decision making of state 
 bodies, local municipal bodies or international organizations, involving intimidation of 
 the population and (or) other forms of illegal violent actions (Bridge, 2009 p.14). 
Also, the definition of terrorist acts is: 
 The commission of an explosion, arson or other actions, intimidating the population and 
 creating the danger of death of people, causing considerable property damage or an attack 
 of heavy consequences, with the aim of influencing the decision making of agencies of 
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 power or international organizations, and also threatening the commission of the activity 
 in that aim (Bridge, 2009 p.18). 
The Russian definitions of terrorism and terrorist actions distract from the research by classifying 
violence directed toward military personnel and “other.”  The broad scope and potential 
application of the law may be abused for the purposes of constraining the freedom of media and 
political repression (Omelicheva, 2009).  Thus, for the purposes of this research, the proposed 
definition of violence will be used instead of the Russian definition of terrorism and terrorist 
acts.   
 Also, the scholarly works on the spread of violence in the Northern Caucasus tend to use 
the terms of civil war/rebellion and insurgency interchangeably (Sagramoso, 2007; Fearon & 
Laitin, 2003; O’Loughlin & Witmer, 2010).  Scholars of law, Glahn and Taulbee have noted, “a 
rebellion that has not yet achieved the standing of a belligerent community is said to be in a state 
of insurgency” (2010 p. 161).  The Russian government has never politically referred to the 
rebels/terrorists/bandits as a “traditional” belligerent community, thus internationally the conflict 
in Chechnya can never be referred to as a civil war, though it showed the traditional indicators of 
civil war such as an organized resistance that possessed territorial control (Grau & Kipp, 2000).  
Rather, the Chechen republic can be referred to as being in a state of insurgency since 1994.  
Insurgencies are kin to irregular guerilla warfare, which consist of limited territorial control, with 
the added components of informational/psychological operations and relatively weaker forces 
(Hoffman, 2006).  They are also offensive in nature and are fueled by ethnic and religious ties 
with political objectives being their primary motivation (Javed, 2010).  This distinction may 
appear to “split hairs,” but it helps better frame the regional issue as a potential spread in 
insurgency related violence.   
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 Verifying the data on on the magnitude of insurgent violence in the republics is a very 
difficult task.  This is due to the lack of systematic evidence on attacks,  the difficulty in 
determining reliable sources of data that report violent events and counts  of actors/factions 
involved in the fighting.  Therefore, Tables 1 and 2consist of both independently researched 
instances of insurgent violence (gathered from The Caucasian Knot and KavkazCenter) and data 
from the Global Terrorism Database (GTD).  Both forms of data are used to show the trends in 
violent insurgent actions.  The research design section of this study establishes an appropriate 
definition for violence in an attempt to differentiate between acts of insurgent violence and other 
criminal forms of violence.  The GTD data does not provide a perfect match for the definition 
and limits the ability of representing an accurate portrayal of violence in the republics.  However, 
every attempt was made, while collecting the data, to fit each event within the defined criteria for 
violence.  
Table 1. Insurgent Violent Actions in Dagestan 
 
 
Table 2. Insurgent Violent Actions in Ingushetia 
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Definitions and Operationalization of the Explanatory Factors of Violence  
An economic hypothesis of violence postulates that the growing levels of economic inequality in 
these republics determine the spread of violence committed by insurgent forces in Dagestan and 
Ingushetia. 
 The existing data on budgets, rates of inequality, standards of living in separate territorial 
units within the federation, as well as federal financial assistance to republics is either 
inaccessible or unreliable. Republics, themselves, rarely makes the data public.  Thus, 
determining the impact of economic inequality on insurgent violence in Dagestan and Ingushetia 
will be a challenge.  This is not to say that the research is impossible, but rather that a 
combination of sources will be required to paint an accurate picture of the economic realities of 
people living within the republics.   
 I will identify the levels of social and economic disparity through systematic analysis of 
reports published by NGOs, IGOs and selective Russian government’s documents.  In addition, 
the World Bank, the United Nations and the International Monetary Fund will be used as the 
primary sources of information.  The documents from these organizations will be used to 
measure the employment rates, government aid and the growth in average wages for workers.  
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Also, due to unreliable and/or non-specific information regarding the Dagestani and Ingushetian 
economic sectors, supplemental regional secondary sources will assist in the determination of 
economic inequality in the republics (i.e. national and regional news publications).  Each source 
of information will be assessed against the time frame established in the beginning of the section. 
According to the “political grievance and political repression hypothesis”, the Russian 
government has allowed for the spread of the insurgency movement by restraint of political 
processes in Dagestan and Ingushetia.  
 Political repression is ambiguous at best, but it is believed to be a leading indicator in the 
increase of internal armed conflict, according to the reviewed literature.  Determining the 
availability or quality of political participation is often difficult to quantify.  Also, the third 
hypothesis is aimed at assessing political restrictions that may or may not extend from both 
beyond and within Dagestan and Ingushetia.   
 Political repression can be measured by assessing the extent and magnitude of punitive 
extra-judicial measures (i.e. crackdowns, mass arrests and social restrictions) and the lack 
freedom of assembly (i.e. group involvement in governance and protests).  The best way to 
measure these factors is to compile primary and secondary accounts from online publications, 
government documents and NGO’s.  Freedom House, Memorial, the U.S. State Departments 
Human Rights Report and the Caucasian Knot are examples of the sources to be used.  The 
events described in the publications will be placed against the temporal backdrop of 2002 to 
2008 with comparisons in insurgent violence represented. 
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According to the “ethnicity hypothesis”, insurgent violence in  Dagestanis and Ingushetians are 
ethno-political. It is driven by the exclusion of certain ethnic groups from the political processes 
in the republics and religious radicalization of ethnic minorities….  
 This hypothesis is aimed at assessing the impact of the current ethnic social identity in 
the region by measuring the historical migration and religious structures of Dagestan and 
Ingushetia. “Ethnicity” or “ethnic based conflict” has already been studied thoroughly, but they 
cannot be effectively understood without their historical development.  A simple assessment as 
to the number of ethnicities or religious groups within Dagestan and Ingushetia will not 
adequately demonstrate a correlation between ethnicity and violence.  Rather, insight into the 
historical movements (i.e. migration and displacement) of peoples and the progression of radical 
Islamist identification, in tandem, will either verify or invalidate the proposed hypothesis of the 
ethnic contribution to the violence.  
 Measuring both historical movements and radical Islamist identification from 1990 to 
2008 are required so as to address the recent developments in the republics.  A variety of sources 
will be used to assess the proposed units of measure.  Existing historical and statistical accounts 
(currently gathering data) will be used to appraise migration/displacement and the radicalization 
of Islam in relation to insurgent violence from 2002 to 2008.   
Regional Spillover 
A “spillover hypothesis” of conflict postulates that violence in Dagestan and Ingushetia is a 
direct consequence of violence that has been taking place in Chechnya due to the similarities in 
economic and political conditions, as well as the presence of the same ethnic groups in all 
territories.   
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 Studies on the nature of internal armed conflict spillover often focus on the concepts of 
contagion and diffusion.  Rather than classifying the events unfolding in the North Caucasus as a 
spreading disease (contagion), this study attempts to represent the conflict as a diffusion of 
structural similarities (economic conditions, political repression, ethnicity/religion) in the 
republics, which share a correlation with the increasing levels of insurgency related violent 
events. Determining if an occurrence of conflict spillover from Chechnya to the surrounding 
republics exists, requires a balanced analysis of Dagestan and Ingushetia.   
 Hypotheses 1-3 test the scholarly notions as to origins of the spreading insurgent violence 
within each republic.  Drawing on the verification or rejection of the proposed hypotheses, the 
determination of violence may be viewed in the light of having similar or dissimilar origins that 
may or may not extend from the Chechen conflicts.  Therefore, the concluding comparison 
between Dagestan and Ingushetia will determine the validity of the proposed hypothesis.   
Selection of Cases 
 The goal of the proposed research is to determine attributive factors for the spread in 
violence (as depicted in the above definition) in the Northern Caucasus by studying the republics 
of Dagestan and Ingushetia.  The selection of these two separate republics is because of their 
close relation and proximity to Chechnya.  Also, the analysis of socio-political, socio-economic 
and ethnic factors within these republics will help to shape a comprehensive understanding of 
insurgent violence in the NCFD outside of the often cited Chechen conflict (Collier & Hoeffler, 
2004; Sagramoso, 2007; Buhaug & Gledisch, 2008; Muller & Seligson, 1987; Fearon & Laitin, 
2003).  This research will add to the existing literature by assessing the factors that contribute to 
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insurgent violence, as they relate to Dagestan and Ingushetia, while utilizing the dominant 
approaches to internal conflict and insurgency research. 
 The question of the widening reach of violence in the Northern Caucasus has generally 
relied upon a broad blanketed analysis of economic, geographic, and political approaches.  
Limited data sets, conflicting reports, and the intricacies of various conflicting parties in the 
Northern Caucasus limits a researcher’s abilities to effectively tackle the topic (O’Loughlin & 
Witmer, 2010).  Nonetheless, every conflict is unique in its own way and should be analyzed 
according to their regional context.   
Economics and Insurgent Violence 
Dagestan  
 The economic hypothesis stated in the research design will reveal that an inverse 
relationship exists between economic decline/stagnation and the propensity for internal armed 
conflict.  The Republic of Dagestan’s (Республика Дагестан) economy, which is primarily 
comprised of oil and natural gas production, raw materials, textile production, food processing 
and agriculture, has been marred by economic decline or stagnation for the past two decades 
(Roshchin, 2006).  In the early part of the decade, Russia’s Prime Minister, Vladimir Putin, 
stated that the most important factor for the rehabilitation of Dagestan is an increase in federal 
funding and the creation of jobs (Facts on File World News Digest, 2004). This belief assumes 
the idea that an economic “turnaround” for the republic would reduce the areas level of insurgent 
involvement and activity.  However, toward the middle of the decade the Jamestown Foundation 
(2007) stated that the federal government subsidizes 80% of Dagestan’s economy and the 
economy has had little internal development.   
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 The economic data analyzed from 2001- 2008 indicates mixed support for this 
hypothesis.   Primarily, basic socioeconomic data for the three million people of Dagestan 
statistical accounts published by Interfax and Rosstat (Russian Federal Service of State Statistics) 
underline the changing trends within the republic (Isaev, 2010).  The data collected for this 
research utilized a variety of sources including Interfax (a provider of breaking business, political 
and general news) and Rosstat (Russian Federation Federal State Statistics Service) statistical 
analyses, as well as newspaper reports from leading politicians commenting on the economic 
conditions in Dagestan.  Average wage per worker rates, unemployment level, the registered 
unemployment level and other non-quantifiable factors reveal the level of economic change 
within the region.   
 The subsistence living rate within the Russian Federation is 1817 RUB (62.66 USD); this 
is considered the poverty line.  On average, workers within Dagestan saw wages increase from 
an estimated 1731 RUB (59.68 USD) a month in 2001 to an estimated 8579 RUB (295.87 USD) 
a month in 2009, so that an average worker monthly wage increased by 496% within 8 years.  
From 1999-2001, the Dagestani economy was ravaged by the Chechen incursion of 1999, but as 
large-scale military operations were ending, individual salaries were on the rise.  This may be 
due to the fact that the large-scale military operations were winding down and the Second 
Chechen War transitioned into a more general, Caucasus wide, counter terrorism operation from 
2002 onward.  In general, this supports scholarly research that regional economies affected by 
regional conflict have a tendency to rebound quickly after hostilities have ended, but the wage 
increases prove to be misleading in this case (Murdoch & Sandler, 2002).   
 Accurate statistics on unemployment from 2001-2006 are extremely difficult to find, but 
Interfax statistics of the registered unemployed from 2001 to 2005 indicated that roughly 2-3% 
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of the population was registered as unemployed.  Gordon M. Hahn (2007), a senior researcher 
for the Center for Terrorism and Intelligence Studies, records that the true number of 
unemployed from this time frame may never be known but estimates that the number ranges 
from 20-40% of the economically active population (the population who is capable of providing 
labor and services).   This number leaves anywhere from 17-37% of the population unaccounted 
for in the economy of Dagestan for the given dates.  The official unemployment rate given for 
the region in 2008 (Table 4, all dates correspond to the previous year) was 16%.  This 
percentage, if accurate, represents a significant decrease in the unemployed over the course of 
the decade, but this improvement should not overshadow the fact that this unemployment rate 
represents nearly 500,000 individuals.   
 Then again, the official Russian Federation statistics are “flawed because of the 
enormous unofficial income that does not show up in official records” (Twickel, 2008).  
President Mukhu Aliev of Dagestan himself has been quoted as believing that 70% of the 
republic’s economy operates within the black and grey economies (Crisis Group, 2008).  The 
unemployed of Dagestan, as well as some of the employed, are major contributors to the black 
market economy.  Quantifying the number of people involved in black market dealings is nearly 
impossible to do.  Certain individuals, as well as the companies they work for, make payments 
and salaries unofficially in order to avoid taxes (2008). This behavior is limited to the wealthy 
individual elite who already have the advantages of economic opportunities (2008).  Political 
corruption, in this case, would appear to be the foremost driver of the unregulated economy, 
which in turn hampers further economic growth for the republic. 
 Corruption aside, the decrease in unemployment and the rapid growth in the average 
workers monthly salary should, in theory, decrease the likelihood for further insurgent conflict.  
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This is not the case, however.  The Dagestani insurgency has actually increased in prominence, if 
not in its relative capabilities, over the course of the last decade.  The unemployment level and 
the republic’s slow economic growth directly relates to the rise of insurgent violence in 
Dagestan. 
Table 3.  Selected Statistical Indicators of Dagestan’s economic Development Reported by 
Interfax. 
Dagestan 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 
Average Wage Per worker 
(Including Social Payments in 
RUB)  1731.8 2029.4 2610.8 * 3285 
Subsistence level per capita as % of 
previous year 123.5 151.8 133 * 114.1 
Unemployed persons seeking work 
Through unemployment services 
(‘000 people) 48.9 55.1 53.5 * 56.2 
Of Which Registered Unemployed 
(‘000 people) 48.2 54.2 53 * 55.1 
Number of Unemployed Eligible 
for Unemployment Benefits (‘000 
people) 34.8 40.9 42.6 * 48.6 
Demand for Workers reported by 
Companies (people) 1363 947 686 * 744 
Real Monetary Income as % of 
previous year 102 109 98 146.6 173.5 
Disposable Cash Income  1044.2 1955.4 2230.7 3234.9 6194.7 
Per Capita Consumer Expenditure 
in RUR 534.1 1306.4 1497.6 2184.2 5149.8 
Cash Incomes 120 123.3 110.3 157.7 191.5 
Per Capita Consumer Expenditure 
as % of previous year 120.9 134.4 121.2 144 235.8 
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Table 4. Selected Statistical Indicators of Dagestan’s Economic Development Reported by 
Rosstat. 
Dagestan (indicators in value 
terms, as percentage of the 
corresponding period of 
previous year) 2006 
Oct. 
2007 
Nov. 
2008 
Oct. 
2009 
Real Money Income of 
Population * 119.5 115.6 110.3 
Real Monthly accrued Wages * 118.7 112.3 106.7 
Real Fixed Monthly Pensions * 101.7 112.4 110 
Socio Economic Indicators     
 Population in Person increase 
or decrease * -1663 14430 14747 
Number of unemployed per 
thousand persons * 29 237.7 140.3 
Unemployment percent of 
economically active pop. * 14 18.7 16.3 
Average per capita monthly 
money income of pop. (RUB) * 4183.3 8908.5 11232.3 
Avg. monthly nominal 
accrued wages, RUB * 6088.8 7035.5 8579.6 
 
Ingushetia 
 The Republic of Ingushetia (Респу́блика Ингуше́тия) has a population density nearly ¼ 
the size of Dagestan’s, about 500,000 individuals.  Also like the Dagestani economy, the 
Ingushetian economy is based off of the agricultural, manufacturing and energy based industries.  
Oil and timber are the primary commodities of the republic, but simply having these abundant 
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resources has not assisted in the development of a stable economy for the people of Ingushetia 
(Kommersant, 2004).  Again, as with the Republic of Dagestan, an inverse correlation can be 
seen between the growing insurgent threat and economic instability.   However, the Ingushetian 
economy has proven to be less stable in comparison to Dagestan.   
 The wages and incomes of the working population should provide an adequate marker for 
the living standards of Ingushetians.  The average monthly wages of workers in Ingushetia saw a 
general increase of nearly 3,350 RUB (115 USD) per month from 2001-2005 (Table 5).  Though 
an average increase in worker’s salaries were declared, in 2004 the Ingush Prime Minister Timur 
Mogushkov stated that he believed 90% of the republic’s population lived under the national 
minimum subsistence level of 1,817 RUB (64 USD) per month (Maisigov, 2004).  This 
statement and the official statistics are conflicting with each other but the official statistics 
include social payments made to wage earners.  Also, even though the poverty line in Ingushetia 
is far below that of the rest of Russia during this period the two poorest regions, Dagestan and 
Ingushetia, were still growing (Balyasny, 2004).  “Growing” appears to refer to the increase in 
consumer expenditures and investments, which are contested. 
 However, the end of the decade marked a decrease in the per capita income for the 
population.  In 2009, the per capita income of individuals declined by nearly 520 RUB (18 USD) 
from 2007, which is roughly a 9% decrease in income per month (Table 6).  The per capita 
average had increased to 5123 RUB (177 USD) over the course of the decade, although social 
benefits were still required for nearly half of the population in 2006 prior to the decrease in 
wages according to Ingushetia’s President Murat Zyazikov (Itar-Tass, 2006).  This should mean 
that the official per capita income averages do not reflect the income of the entire population.  
Rather, the per capita average reflects the growth of the Ingushetian economy as a whole and 
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does not reflect the fluctuation in population that is poverty stricken and/or unemployed.  The 
unemployment rate within Ingushetia is the most telling of the dire economic situation the 
republic has faced over the course of the decade. 
 This disparity is seen in the unemployment level of Ingushetia from 2001-2009.  The 
number of unemployed, both registered and unregistered, is representative of the situation in 
which Ingushetia finds itself.  The registered unemployment rate during the 2001-2005 periods 
averaged 4.75% (Table 5).  This, however, is only the legally registered unemployment rate and 
the actual unemployment rate was estimated at nearly 80% in this period (The Economist, 2005).  
Chechnya is the only republic with a comparable unemployment rate, which underlines the 
mutual economic hardship shared by the republics that was caused by the Second Chechen 
Conflict (2005).  The official unemployment statistics for Ingushetia in 2009 indicate a 50% 
unemployment rate for the economically active population (Table 6).  The Rosstat statistics for 
the 2007-2009 intervals show an average increase in unemployment toward the end of the 
decade, but the statistics appear to conflict with other estimates declaring 58%, which lead 
Russian politicians to believe that drastic measures need to be implemented to curb the problem 
(Table 6; Fuller, 2009). The employment conditions have remained dismal over the course of the 
decade, even with a 30% decline in unemployment and a rise in per capita income. 
 The growth of Ingushetia’s economy is among the slowest in the Russian Federation and 
the unemployment rate is the lowest according to The Moscow Times (Osipovich, 2008).  This 
also offers the insight that the average gains for individuals are lopsided creating an economic 
atmosphere of unequal wealth distribution within and among the Russian Federation’s republics 
(Balyasny, 2004; Osipovich, 2008).  A strong and vibrant black market economy, coupled with 
rampant corruption, has been associated with the failing economic situation in Ingushetia.  
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Though these numbers cannot be directly quantified, their very real effects have attributed to the 
stagnation of the Ingushetian economy, which will be discussed in a later section.  Nonetheless, 
the stagnation of the republic’s economy has created an atmosphere of economic desperation that 
directly relates to the level of insurgent violence in the region. 
Table 5.  Selected Statistical Indicators of Ingushetia’s Economic Development Reported by 
Interfax. 
Ingushetia 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 
Average Wage Per worker (Incl 
Social Payments in RUR) 1695.8 3462.6 4252.8 * 5048.5 
Subsistence level per capita as % of 
previous year 126.6 142.9 131.2 * 142.7 
Unemployed persons seeking work 
Through unemployment services 10 15.8 22.1 * 49.5 
Of Which Registered Unemployed 8.6 13.8 20.2 * 44.6 
Number of Unemployed Eligible for 
Unemployment Benefits 8.1 12.8 19.2 * 42.8 
Demand for Workers reported by 
Companies 19 142 107 * 94 
Real Monetary Income 142 72.8 119.4 115.7 104.1 
Disposable Cash Income as % of 
previous year 781.4 1026.5 1283.6 1702.1 2053.2 
Per Capita Consumer Expenditure 
in rubles 420.7 407.8 392.8 508 613.4 
Cash Incomes 195.7 86.2 140.8 121.3 120.6 
Per Capita Consumer Expenditure 
as % 319.2 62 99.5 89.8 120.7 
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Table 6. Selected Statistical Indicators of Ingushetia’s Economic Development Reported by 
Rosstat. 
Ingushetia (indicators in value 
terms, as percentage of the 
corresponding period of 
previous year) 2006 2007 2008 2009 
Real Money Income of 
Population * 125.4 154.5 79.8 
Real Monthly accrued Wages * 106.1 105.4 101.4 
Real Fixed Monthly Pensions * 106 108.9 113.4 
Socioeconomic Indicators     
 Population in Person increase 
or decrease * 17846 3584 3469 
Number of unemployed per 
thousand persons * 250 75.6 122.4 
Unemployment percent of 
economically active pop. * 21 45 50.1 
Average per capita monthly 
money income of pop. * 5991.4 5817.3 5123.1 
Avg. monthly nominal accrued 
wages, * 4623.1 9063 10386.2 
 
Table 7.  Russia Yearly Inflation Rate Provided by www.indexmundi.com 
Year 
Inflation, average 
consumer prices Percent Change 
2001 21.461 3.30% 
2002 15.783 -26.46% 
2003 13.666 -13.41% 
2004 10.887 -20.34% 
2005 12.683 16.50% 
2006 9.679 -23.69% 
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2007 9.007 -6.94% 
2008 14.108 56.63% 
2009 11.654 -17.39% 
 
Political Openness, Corruption and Press Freedom in the Russian Federation 
 Over the course of the past decade, Russia’s openness and press freedoms were 
precipitously downgraded.  In 2000-2001, Russia was considered partly free sweeping anti-
corruption, tax code and other legal reforms that then President Vladimir Putin began 
implementing (Freedom House, 2002). Nonetheless, political openness and equality were already 
besieged at this point, with Freedom House (2002) citing “serious irregularities” in his election 
efforts.  When elected, Putin’s political battles revolved around combating the influence of 
Russia’s oligarchs, which was seen as an attempt (and a success) at increasing the centralization 
of both political control and the judiciary (2002).  The Freedom House Country Reports declared 
that the Russian Federation was “not free” for the remainder of the decade on the basis that 
political and judicial corruption was rampant, citing selective enforcement of anti-corruption 
legislation and “illegal detentions” in the Northern Caucasus (2003-2009).  Indeed, Transparency 
International (2003-2007, 2009) indicated that Russia’s rankings among the most corrupt 
countries corrected only slightly, showing little signs of correction in the near term.  Among the 
polled population of Russia, the police and public officials were believed to be among the most 
susceptible to corruption, with a 63% rating (Transparency International, 2009). 
 Press freedoms in the country were downgraded from “partly free” in 2001 to “not free” 
for the rest of the decade (Freedom House, 2002-2009).  According to Freedom House’s 
Freedom of the Press reports (2002-2009), the accessibility of independent media outlets 
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dropped and politically influenced information censorship experienced a sweeping rise.  Among 
the most contentious issues was the censorship of “human rights abuses in the Northern 
Caucasus, government corruption, organized crime… and police torture”  (2008).  These issues 
are among the most pressing abuses in the republics of Dagestan and Ingushetia. 
 These are important macro-scale indicators of political oppression in Russia as a whole 
and set the framework for addressing the same issues in the two republics.  Due to the lack of 
regional statistics on political openness, press freedoms and corruption, secondary sources 
provide the best outlet for identifying the multiplicity of political and judicial infractions and 
their severity.  The absence of statistical data for analysis does not hamper the research, owed in 
large part to the shear number of reports made by NGOs and news sources on the subject. 
Dagestan 
 The fall of the Soviet Union allowed Dagestan with an opportunity to create a democratic 
republic on the basis of multi-ethnic power sharing.  A brief overview of this system will shed 
light on the contemporary problems of the republic.  The “new” elites created after the collapse 
bestowed material and financial wealth upon individuals as a source of legitimacy and power, 
which was not unlike many other regions of the former Soviet Union (Ware and Kisriev 2010).  
Nearly 200 clans entered the political climate through this mad power grab, but political 
mobilization within the republic required the consolidation of ethnicities through various 
“ethnoparties” (2010).  Yet the smaller ethnicities in the republic were often resentful of the 
larger power wielding ethnicities (Avars, Dargins, Kumyks, Lezgins) but during the political 
shift of the 1990s, the multi-ethic Dagestan created a multi-tiered power structure to combat this 
resentment.  A power sharing political system was set in place by the Constitution of Dagestan 
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and the republic possessed a “relatively” pluralistic society with guaranteed freedom of the press 
and electoral freedom (2010).  This system eventually eroded away when Russia sought a policy 
of recentralization toward Moscow and resentment began to build in the republic.   
 Currently, Dagestan’s political and law enforcement structures can be loosely compared 
to America’s Wild West of the late 1800s.  Abductions, forced detentions, extrajudicial 
executions and violent actions taken toward journalists and lawyers by police are just some of 
the weekly events citizens of Dagestan have endured.  However, the majority of primary and 
secondary articles address statistics and events regarding human rights and armed insurgent 
actions within Chechnya prior to 2003 rather than the region as a whole or its other republics.  
Undeniably, scholars, journalists and politicians viewed the events unfolding in Chechnya 
through the lens of “the here and now.” Thus, limited analyses and commentary exists regarding 
corruption and political oppression within Dagestan prior to the initiation of counter-insurgency 
operations in 2002.  Measuring the effects of the greater abuses of political leaders and their 
control structures (i.e. police, laws) from 2002-2009 is the most effective way of identifying 
variable links for insurgent violence in these regions.  Evaluating alleged security service abuses, 
press freedoms and forms of political corruption can do this.   
 Electoral fraud and other political abuses are emblematic of the institutional structures of 
Dagestan.  Dagestan is a republic of particular concern because numerous reports of electoral 
fraud are cited by NGOs, journalists and foreign government documents (U.S. Department of 
State, 2002-2008; Caucasian Knot, 2007; Vatchagaev, 2007a).  In specific instances, the 
Committee of the Communist Party of the Russian Federation, Union of Right-Wing Forces and 
electoral observers claim that major electoral fraud marred the 2007 and 2008 elections 
(Caucasian Knot, 2007; Caucasian Knot, 2008).  With electoral fraud being a major staple point 
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for the republic, the citizens of Dagestan are unable to elect a leader independent of internal 
cronyism.  Also, the appointment of the republic’s attorney general, the judges, the head of the 
local FSB division and the republic’s minister of Internal Affairs are all appointed by Moscow 
(Vatchagaev, 2007a).  This represents a concerning disconnect between the republic, the federal 
government and the people of Dagestan. 
 One such element of joint cooperation, however, is the utilization of interior ministry 
forces and other Russian security services.  Throughout the 2000s, security services conducted 
“antiterrorism operations” that subjected the population of Dagestan to illegal detentions, torture 
and summary executions (Memorial, 2007).  Abductions, or forced disappearances as they are 
also known, are among the most familiar abuses perpetrated by security forces within the region, 
as is seen in both Ingushetia and Chechnya.  The U.S. Department of State’s Country Report on 
Human Rights outlined the progression of abductions and disappearances over the course of the 
decade.  The 2002 report indicated that criminal groups were behind the growing number of 
abductions, financial and political gain being among the primary motivations (U.S. Department 
of State, 2002).  Memorial contradicts this report by pointing to the abductions, detentions and 
forced confessions of suspected rebel collaborators during the Dagestan campaigns of 1999 to 
2001 (Memorial, 2007).  The contradiction aside, the security services increasingly became a 
leading factor in the spread of insurgent violence within Dagestan.  The Human Rights Reports 
(2007) do not reference any further abductions or disappearances until 2007, in which they 
marked a notable increase of 22 disappearances in Dagestan.  However, the NGO Mothers of 
Dagestan reported 21 disappearances in 2006, which hardly proves a dramatic shift in 
disappearances (2007).  Furthermore, the disappearances in 2008 and 2009 were 11 and 31 
respectively (U.S. State Department, 2008, 2009).   
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 Curiously, abductions and disappearances within Dagestan appear to be relatively less 
commonplace when compared to the population and situation in Ingushetia.  A possible answer 
for these findings is that the security forces, as presumed perpetrators, have switched their tactics 
following the release of suspected rebel collaborators in 2002, in which the collaborators began 
to “shoot dead ’by the list’ the security forces that had tortured them” (Memorial, 2007).  Also, 
Memorial (2007) indicates that the security services have become more organized and their 
actions methodically planned, so as not to bring attention to them.  On a regional scale, Amnesty 
International (2009) has reported that nearly 5,000 people have disappeared across the North 
Caucasus from 1999 to 2008, although all cases may not be accounted for.  Further exploratory 
research will be needed to determine the true extent of the disappearance situation in Dagestan, 
but existing reports tell a tale of increasing violence perpetrated by law enforcement officials that 
began to spin out of control following the end of the second conflict.   
 Recently, protests took place in Makhachkala (the capital of Dagestan) where citizens are 
condemning, not only abductions, but the increasing violence in the region (Memorial, 2010).  A 
press release for the event stated, “Dagestan is loosing its men.  During the latest month around 
50 people from both sides were killed… But we condemn strongly the growing lawlessness of 
power structures.  We demand from power structures to keep the law” (Memorial, 2010 p.1).  
Though this event did not take place during the study, the frustration expressed by the Dagestani 
people did not occur over night.  The feelings of frustration and hopelessness have come from 
the lawlessness of both militants and authorities.  The unemployed and downtrodden youth of 
Dagestan appear to be the most affected by this source of frustration.   Meetings of Dagestan’s 
Interior Ministry reiterate the impact of the conflict on youth by stressing the importance of 
protecting Dagestani youth from extremist jammats (Vatchagev, 2009).  “Shariat Jamaat has 
 
 
40 
little difficulty recruiting young Dagestanis who are unemployed, traumatized by cruelty endured 
in jail and motivated by propaganda promoting jihad and armed resistance” (Crisis Group, 2008). 
Thus, the replenishing of jammat ranks is easily facilitated by Dagestan’s economic situation and 
the politically grounded anti-insurgency operations conducted by the security forces (2009).    
Ingushetia 
 In 2008, the owner of www.ingusheia.ru (a human rights whistleblower for Ingushetia), 
Magomed Yevloyev was shot in the head after being arrested by local Ingushetian authorities 
(The Economist, 2008).  The authorities claimed that Yevloyev resisted arrest and reached for 
the officer’s firearm, a claim that is refuted by people who knew him (BBC, 2008).  Yevloyev 
was an outspoken critic of the Ingush President Zyazikov, as well as the president’s security 
services (2008).  In the months leading up to his death, Yevloyev began a campaign that sought 
to uncover electoral fraud in the previous years parliamentary elections (The Economist, 2008).  
This story is only one of many for Ingushetia and it is one that encompasses all the republic’s 
socio-political issues such as electoral fraud, abduction, extrajudicial execution and media 
suppression. 
 The suppression of Ingush electoral freedoms over the last decade was revealing of the 
condition of Ingushetia as a whole.  A “handpicked” Moscow candidate, Murat Zyazikov, 
replaced popular Ingush President, Ruslan Aushev, in the 2002 elections (The Jamestown 
Foundation, 2008).  The replacement is believed to have stemmed from Aushev’s refusal to 
allow Ingushetia to be dragged into the Second Chechen War militarily; others believe that 
Aushev was too unmanageable for Moscow (The Economist, 2008).  Either way, the 2002 
elections within the republic were the last because the then President Vladimir Putin had 
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abolished regional elections in 2004, thus depriving the Ingush citizens of the opportunity to 
elect a true Ingushetian representative (2008).  Again, one of the only opportunities for free and 
fair elections was the contested Duma elections of 2007 in which it is claimed that 28% of the 
officially claimed 98% of participant voters, stated that they never participated in the elections 
(BBC, 2007; Leonova, 2008; Fuller, 2008).  Also, similar accusations were presented in the 2008 
presidential elections of Dimitry Medvedev (Leonova, 2008; Fuller, 2008).  However, writers at 
The Economist noted that “Ingushetia has traditionally been loyal to Moscow,” (2008) despite 
the injustices suffered in the republic. 
 Ingushetia was not the only member of the Russian federation with evidence of voter 
fraud and electoral misconduct but the greater impact of the fraud created the atmosphere for a 
bolstering of insurgent support. Due to Zyazikov’s political appointment via Moscow, he was 
wholly reliant on the federal structure of Putin’s Russia.  Vladimir Putin forced President 
Zyazikov to resign in 2008 when the situation in Ingushetia sharply devolved into what 
“resembled a civil war,” citing a general dissatisfaction with his job performance (The 
Economist, 2008; Vatchagaev, 2008a).  Indeed, citizens of Ingushetia felt that Zyazikov was 
deliberately misleading the Kremlin about the security situation in Ingushetia, which had allowed 
the insurgency to gain ground (Fuller, 2007).  Likewise, leaders of other republics were noted as 
saying that they did not wish to hear “Zyazikov fairy tales” when discussing economic and 
security issues (BBC, 2008).  Whether an individual considers this political ignorance or 
arrogance is subject to dispute, but the fact remains that the deterioration of the security situation 
within Ingushetia was crumbling from the time of Zyazikov’s election/appointment.  Since 2002, 
the violence within Ingushetia increased steadily questioning the stability and implementation of 
law and order from security services. 
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 Highlighting the gravity of the security situation, the citizens of Ingushetia have seen an 
increase in abductions and disappearances from 2004 to 2009.  In the early 2000s, rebels were 
believed to be the primary perpetrators of abductions and kidnapping in attempts to obtain 
ransom to fund their operations (U.S. Department of State, 2002, 2003).  The state of affairs 
changed in 2004 when the FSB (Federal Security Services, Федеральная служба безопасности) 
and Ingushetian Interior Ministry Forces began partaking in similar activities, though they were 
not seeking ransom (U.S. Department of State, 2004).  Rather, they were primarily focused on 
finding insurgents and rebel bandits hiding among the civilian population.  The 2004 U.S. State 
Department’s Country Report on Human Rights indicated, “human rights groups estimated that 
several dozen individuals had disappeared in Ingushetia” (2005).   
 As the decade progressed, 33 people were abducted and 10 were declared “disappeared” 
(abductions refer to those people who were taken against their will; disappearances refer to the 
numbers of people abducted and never found) in Ingushetia in 2005 (U.S. Department of State, 
2005).  A slight increase can be noted in 2006 when 35 people were abducted and 5 disappeared 
and a total of 22 disappearances in 2007 (U.S. Department of State, 2006, 2007).  The noted 
level of abductions is not referenced in the U.S. State Departments Country Reports on Human 
Rights after 2004, but abductions and abuses by security forces were strongly referenced during 
this period (2007).  Amnesty International (2007) has recorded the total number of disappeared 
persons as 179 between 2002-2007.  According to the U.S. State Department (2009), the NGO 
MAShR (МАШР, Autonomous Non-profit Organization of Ingushetia) recorded a total of 234 
disappearances in 2009. This number is almost fantastical in the sense that the numbers of 
disappearances in one year surpassed those of the previous eight.  “Today, we can say that the 
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large accumulation of military men led to the increasing facts of human rights violations and 
worsening criminogenic situation in Ingushetia” (MAShr p. 8).    
 The assumption by MAShR does not appear to occur without merit.  In the State 
Department’s Country Reports the citation of the abuses of military forces are readily apparent 
with supporting literature.  “Night raids,” “zachistka” operations or anti-terrorism operations 
have ostracized the civilian population in Ingushetia.  However, there are no definitive 
explanations as to the origins of disappearances and abductions by individuals of the federal and 
internal forces.  Nonetheless, a significant number of abducted persons have been found within 
the custody of these forces, which has led to the speculation of both torture and extrajudicial 
execution as a form of punishment (U.S. Department of State, 2004-2009).   
  Currently, MAShR’s website (www.mashr.org) lists the number of disappeared persons 
as 196.  This number appears to clash with the official U.S. State Departments numbers, but the 
number is still significant nonetheless.  In 2004, a notable upsurge in suspicious homicides began 
taking place and the republic, in general, saw an increase in deaths where “unknown assailants” 
were blamed (Table 8).  2004, as an outlier, is due to the fact that Ingushetian rebels, or militant 
extremists, managed to conduct successful territorial operations over the cities of Nazran and 
Karabulak (Memorial, 2007).  An increase in anti-terrorism operations preceded the 2004 
militant attacks and was the beginning of Russia’s prolonged counter terrorism operations 
resembling those in Chechnya.  The Kremlin dispatched military personnel to Ingushetia in an 
attempt to combat the increasing insurgent threat.  Also, 2004 marked the end of large-scale 
operations for the militant forces and instead created the beginning of drawn out guerilla 
operations (2007).  2004 aside, the general upward trend for murders by “unknown assailants” 
has increased dramatically.  The answer for the trend lays in the fact that Russian security forces 
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increased their engagement in “mop up” and counter-insurgency operations (Memorial, 2009, 
2007).  Memorial (2007) states that militant activity increased in the republic after the escalation 
of these measures by state law enforcement officials.   
Table 8. Ingushetian Unknown Assailant Murder Statistics provided by MAShR 
Year Deaths 
2002 25 
2003 26 
2004 174 
2005 61 
2006 96 
2007 124 
2008 212 
2009 304 
 
Ethnicity and Violence in the Republics 
Dagestan 
 The study of the ethnic impact on insurgent violence within Dagestan suggests little 
correlation between their relationships, though the subject adds to the value of the study as a 
whole.  Dagestan is one of the most ethnically diverse republics in the Northern Caucasus, which 
makes the study of this republic vital to the ethnicity hypothesis.  The three largest ethnicities in 
Dagestan are the Avars, Lezgins and Kumyks, with the Avars being the largest ethnic group in 
the republic (MAR, 2009).  No single ethnicity comprises a resounding majority of the republic, 
and dozens of ethnicities compete for their inclusion in the political and economic processes 
(Dzutsev, 2009).  Levels of ethnic militant activity, group inclusion in political processes and 
religious radicalization among the population are used to measure the impact of ethnicity on the 
spread of insurgent violence within Dagestan.   
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 According to the Jamestown Foundation’s Mairbek Vatchagaev (2007a), the region is 
marred by interethnic conflict, and Dagestan is no exception.  Dagestani leaders present their 
republic as a successful cohesion of interethnic relationships for Moscow’s benefit (2007a). The 
report also indicates that the republic suffers from many afflictions and ethnic grievances are just 
one of many factors that led to the republic’s destabilization.  However, this conflicts with the 
data that the Minorities at Risk Project (MAR) have collected on the “at risk” populations in 
Russia.   
 As was stated in the introduction of this section, the Avars are the largest ethnicity in the 
region and they “remain the most powerful ethnic group politically and economically” (MAR, 
2009 p.1).  Though they remain a relative powerhouse in the republic, the Avars maintain their 
status among the remaining ethnicities because of their willingness to concede to the demands of 
other ethnic groups, which exemplifies their belief that ethnic unity and stability is best for the 
republic (2009).  The Lezgins are another Dagestani ethnicity that shares the desire for ethnic 
unity, though Lezgins do not share the same level of economic and political power (In 2006, the 
unofficial Lezgin unemployment rate was 80%; 2009).  The desire for unity between Dagestanis 
is an attempt to prevent Dagestan from turning into another Chechnya (2009).   Compromise and 
other peaceful resolutions to disputes are the goals of both Avars and Lezgins, with MAR stating 
that zero instances of politically motivated violence or protest occurred among the populations 
(2009). 
 Curiously, the Kumyk population of Dagestan has engaged in violent conflicts over the 
course of the study, though relatively few cases were reported (MAR, 2009).  Nonetheless, MAR 
reports that the population harbors “especially strong anti-Russian sentiments,” due in large part 
to historical resistance movements (2009).  The validity of such historical claims is not addressed 
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in this study, but the maintenance of a strong ethnic identity is regarded as the underlying factor 
for the enmity (2009).  Also, MAR believes that the resulting violent clashes against state 
authority have possibly come from Kumyks joining militant Islamic organizations (2009).  
Overall, the most contentious topic for ethnicity studies is the relationship between ethnic groups 
and religion.   
 The three ethnicities of Dagestan that are addressed in this study are religiously identified 
as Sunni Islam (MAR, 2009).  Indeed, the Muslim faith is deeply seeded in the culture of 
Dagestanis, but the rising tide of Islamic extremism in the republic began to take root after the 
second conflict in 1996 (Hunter, 2004).  Militant fighters returned from the conflicts in 
Chechnya and began recruiting in their local communities (Hunter, 2004; Crisis Group, 2008).  
The process was aided by the continued frustration regarding both corruption in politics and the 
stagnation of the republic’s economy (2004).  In 1999, with the rising fear of radical Islamic 
elements coming from Chechnya and the following incursion into Dagestan, an “anti-Wahhabi” 
law was introduced (Crisis Group, 2008).  Wahhabism, or sometimes referred to as Salafism, is a 
form of Islam that is considered both radical and heretical because of its religious teachings and 
practices (globalsecurity, 2011).  In any case, the law the does not provide for a definition of a 
Wahhabi, which has left it open to interpretation by both political parties and law enforcement 
personnel (Crisis Group, 2008; Vatchagaev, 2007b).  The unofficial policy at this time was to 
“identify and hunt down overly pious youth” (2008).  This policy essentially freed the hands of 
the counter-terrorism and security service personnel to detain, interrogate or question individuals 
they branded as Wahhabi.  The law and continued statements by insurgent groups suggests that 
religion provides a pan-Islamist unifying factor in the face of both economic and political 
disparity. 
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 The youth of Dagestan, regardless of ethnic self-identification, are particularly 
susceptible to joining the ranks of the Dagestani Jamaat “Shariat,” or Shariat Jamaat (the official 
title of the Dagestani insurgency).  The ranks of the jamaat are replenished with the Avar, Lak, 
Kumyk and Dargin ethnicities, which adhere to Sunni Islam (Vatchagaev, 2007b).  A possible 
reason for the exclusion of certain ethnicities from the ranks of the jamaats is the “paid for” clan 
loyalty by the Kremlin (KavkazCenter, 2009a).  Also, this research does not attempt to say that 
Muslims caused the insurgency in Dagestan; rather some Dagestani youth have turned to Salafi 
and Wahhabi teachings as “a form of protest against Russian Policies in Dagestan” (Vatchagaev, 
2007b p.1).  Many of the young men who join the jamaats lived through the events and aftermath 
of the first and second Chechen wars, events that possibly fueled their animosity (KavkazCenter, 
2009a).   
 Furthermore, the education level of recruits is not an adequate factor for their recruitment 
or individual acceptance of militant behavior.  The KavkazCenter (2007a) indicates that highly 
educated youth, college and graduate students, from independently wealthy families have joined 
the ranks of militant organizations in Dagestan.  According to Badrudin Shakhuradov, the chief 
of the ministry’s Criminal Investigations Department indicated that the majority of the youth 
joining these movements “either could not or did not want to find a normal role in society” 
(KavkazCenter, 2007a p.1).  This study points toward the former as the more likely answer.   
Ingushetia 
 When compared to its neighboring republic, Dagestan, Ingushetia is a relatively 
homogenous republic, with an estimated 79% of the total population in 2006 (MAR, 2009).  
With relative ethnic cohesion, the republic should remain detached, or at least ethnically 
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removed, from the increasing insurgent violence in Ingushetia.  Also, the Ingush leaders have, 
historically, remained loyal to Moscow while maintaining close ties with the Chechen republic, 
which has created a tentative balance of interests within Ingush society (2009).  Studying 
ethnicity as possible factor for violence in Ingushetia requires historical analysis, intermingled 
with levels of ethnic militant activity, group inclusion in political processes and religious 
radicalization. 
 The Ingush and Chechens enjoy a close relationship because each are closely related 
ethnically, linguistically and culturally (MAR, 2009).  The relevancy of their close ethnic ties is 
questionable; however, their shared history gives them each a shared, yet imbalanced, experience 
with the Stalin era deportations.  In the process, boundary lines were artificially redrawn and 
policy was introduced to deal with the “traitorous” races that were believed to have fought 
against the Soviet Union in WWII. Tens of thousands of ethnic Chechens and Ingushetians were 
removed from the then Chechen-Ingush Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic, and the Ingush 
subsequently lost the Prigorodny district to North Ossetia (Polian, 2004).  The ethnicities 
affected by the deportations were eventually allowed to return to their homeland, however deep 
resentment still exists (2004). When the whole of Russia celebrates Fatherland Defender Day on 
February 23, the Ingush mourn the anniversary of the deportations, indicating a deep collective 
memory (KavkazCenter, 2009).    
 In 1992, a conflict erupted between the Ingush and North Ossetians over the Ingush’s 
ancestral lands in the Prigorodny district (Dzutsev, 2009b).  A clear ethnic dispute originating 
from Soviet geographic and ethnographic manipulation that was “resolved” recently in 2007 
(2009b).  The conflict ended with little societal satisfaction, and low intensity conflict persisted 
for the better part of two decades (2009b).  According to the Jamestown Foundation’s Valery 
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Dzutsev, Ingush President Yunus-Bek Yevkurov stated “that violence in the republic was rooted 
in the unresolved Ingush-Ossetian territorial dispute” (referring to the continuing low intensity 
conflict of the 2000s; 2009b p.1).  This statement represents the conflict as purely territorial 
dispute with ethnic undertones, thus combating the belief that ethnic violence is wholly 
responsible for the problems plaguing the republic.   
 The former president did not adequately address the overall problem of Ingushetia, as 
was stated in earlier chapters.  More simply, problems facing the Republic of Ingushetia are 
more intricate.  The Minorities at Risk Project (2009) specifies that acts of extreme political 
discrimination have been directed toward the Ingush ethnicity.  The only comparable ethnicity 
MAR categorizes with the same discrimination is the neighboring Chechens (2009). This further 
corroborates the broader economic and political sections above. Though reiterating the situation 
in Ingushetia is not intended here, many scholars and Russian officials obscure the extreme 
ethno-political divisions from within Ingushetia (Vachagaev, 2007c).  Two extreme political 
partitions are found from within the Ingush ethnicity, each having similar goals.  The ethnic rift 
is concentrated in the means by which they achieve their desired political objectives.   
 Both the International Institute for Strategic Studies (2008) and The Jamestown 
Foundation (2007), differentiate between the two extremes by indentifying non-violent and 
violent forms of political protest.  Before President Zyazikov was fired, both militant and non-
militant Ingush organizations sought the removal of him as president (IISS, 2008; Vachagaev, 
2007).  The non-militant Ingush organizations, NGOs, civic activists and human rights groups 
sought to express their discontent with local leaders appointed by Moscow and the broader 
political corruption of clan based politics (IISS, 2008).  Meanwhile, radical Islamist militant 
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organizations, such as the Ingush Jamaat, not only sought the removal of Zyazikov, but 
possessed broader religious aspirations for the future of Ingushetia (Vachagaev, 2007).   
 Existing reports often conflict when assessing the number of fighters in the Ingush jamaat 
(IISS, 2008; KavkazCenter, 2009b; Vachagaev, 2007).  However, “the jamaat is predominantly 
composed of ethnic Ingush, though it may include members from other ethnic groups including 
Chechens, Ossetians, Kabardins and Balkars” (Vachagaev, 2007 p.4).  Also, the number of 
jamaat sympathizers appears to outweigh the number of actual radical fighters (IISS, 2008).  
“Mosque members” (Vachagaev, 2007) are the largest in number for the jamaat and are not 
usually prepared to perform combat operations.  The apparent union between the fighters is a 
religious relationship, much like in Dagestan.  MARs (2009) study states that the resounding 
majority of Ingushtetians are Sunnis, but conflicting reports state that the majority of Muslims in 
Ingushetia adhere to the Sufi branch of Islam and that those members of the insurgency adhere to 
Salafism (Vachagaev, 2009a).  Regardless of religious adherence, Islam has provided a unifying 
element against the kafirs (infidels), Christian Ossetians and Russians.   
 A quasi ethno-religious-nationalism has developed within Ingushetia as a result of the 
populations backlash against the insurgency.  Leading members of the Ingush Jamaat have called 
for unification, out of necessity, of Sufi and Salafi sects because of their shared enemy in Russia 
(Vatchagaev, 2009a).  Unfortunately, the youth of Ingushetia are particularly susceptible to such 
influences due to low levels of political and economic opportunity, and their childhoods spent in 
a conflict zone (2009a).  Some believe the Ingush intelligentsia is largely to blame for glorifying 
the conflicts in North Ossetia and Chechnya and that an ideological war has gripped the Ingush 
youth, resulting in the continuing insurgency (KavkazCenter, 2009c).  Meanwhile, others believe 
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“many young men, especially those whose relatives were abducted and disappeared, have 
flocked to join the ranks of the Chechen resistance…” (KavkazCenter, 2007a p.1). 
 The study has indicated that the organization of the Ingush Jamaat is loosely based on 
ethnic heritage and rather closely represented by ideological foundation.   The shared history of 
the Ingush people represents only a portion of the Ingush identity.  Rather, the continued political 
and judicial harassment has continued to dissolution and unify the people, especially the youth, 
of Ingushetia (Vatchagaev, 2010).    
Conflict Spillover from Chechnya 
Table 9. Global Terrorism Database 
 
Dagestan 
 The previous sections have identified the extremely complicated economic, political and 
ethnic state of affairs within Dagestan. The process of identifying a “spillover” effect must 
utilize information gained by these sections to discern the nature of the ongoing violence, which 
will either prove or disprove the hypothesis.  This study proposes that journalists and some 
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scholars have inaccurately concluded that the conflicts in Chechnya have caused the violence 
plaguing the region over the past decade. To underscore this point, Dagestan’s level of insurgent 
activity was almost non-existent at the beginning of the decade, but a notable increase in 
insurgent violence is seen in the decade from 2004 onward (Table 9). This is significant because 
the level of insurgent violence in Dagestan began to out pace that of Chechnya. 
 The economy of Chechnya came to a screeching halt during the second conflict and so 
did the economy of neighboring Dagestan.  Dagestan’s economy suffered from a general decline 
in worker income and a staggering unemployment rate, but as the decade continued the economy 
managed to improve (Table 3; Table 4).  According to the first hypothesis, this should mean that 
the levels of insurgent violence should not have risen.  However, this improvement may be 
misleading due to the general slow growth and continual unemployment rate of nearly 17% in 
2009 (Table 4).   
 The gradual improvement in the economy may account for the relative inconsistency in 
insurgent attacks over the decade as well, meaning that a portion of the population may have 
participated in the economy and removed themselves from participating in the insurgency (Table 
1).  Nonetheless, the insurgency continues to increase operations throughout the republic 
according to the data. This points to a secondary structural factor contributing to insurgent 
violence in Dagestan, which appears to stem from a sense of deep-rooted alienation from the 
political establishments.  Unlike Ingushetia, multi-ethnic Dagestan possessed a degree of ethnic 
and political stability after the fall of the Soviet Union, which was effectively dissolved with the 
bureaucratic reforms of the early 2000s that eliminated the rotating chair of Dagestan’s executive 
(Ware and Kisriev 2010).  The new system had replaced, “the unique democratic system that the 
Dagestanis had innovated in their 1994 constitution in order to accommodate their ethnic 
 
 
53 
heterogeneity and their ancient traditions” (2010, p. 203).  Not surprisingly, the Dagestanis were 
also able to avoid protracted conflict within their republic before the new system, unlike their 
neighbors (2010).   
 As economic decline prevailed in the early 2000s, so did the corruption and cronyism of 
the new bureaucratic system.  Mass protests began to take shape but were suppressed with a 
“brutality previously unprecedented in Dagestan” (Ware and Kisriev, 2010 p. 205).  As the 
population began losing faith in their “democratic” system, insurgent attacks began to increase in 
the republic and the people of Dagestan began to see the recentralization of Dagestan under the 
leadership of the federal center as beneficial (2010). However, as a part of stabilizing the 
republic, the FSB, interior ministry personnel and even Kadyrov’s (appointed President of 
Chechnya) forces began conducting counter insurgency operations, abductions, forced 
disappearances and extrajudicial executions in the republic with impunity (KavkazCenter, 
2007d; Panin, 2005; Human Rights Report, 2002-2009).  In any case, such operations have only 
created “ an indignant, angry backlash… directed solely at the Russian armed forces 
(Vatchagaev, 2007b).  The retaliations following such attacks have only served to further 
destabilize the republic by pushing the youth into confrontations with the security forces 
(KavkazCenter, 2007d; KavkazCenter, 2009d).  The security forces are not solely to blame for 
the spreading conflict in Dagestan.  In truth, the political structure within the republic embodied 
an atmosphere of ethno-political isolationism and severe civilian distrust in local politicians.  
Furthermore, Dagestan’s structural instability assisted in the radicalization of the disaffected 
youth that was/is supported by Islamist extremists in the republic.  
 The conflict in Chechnya did not physically or structurally “spillover” into Dagestan, 
rather Chechnya, and the events following the counter terrorism operations, should rather be 
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considered as a conflict of ideological solidification for the Chechen resistance.  Thus, the 
continuing conflict in Dagestan has differing root causes of instability.  Also, the Republic of 
Dagestan possessed extremist elements prior to the second war, and Dagestan’s insurgency is the 
most active from 2004 to 2008 after the policy transformation of the early 2000s.  The origins of 
the Dagestani jamaat exists within an ideological framework that evolved from the collapse of 
the Soviet Union and the introduction of radical Islamic elements into the social climate, but the 
insurgency movement evolved from a spillover of the Russian policy of recentralization, 
economic collapse and anti-terror/anti-insurgency operations from security services.  Thus, the 
spillover of violent conflict has evolved out of failed social and politicized security policies from 
both the Kremlin and the republic’s leaders. 
Ingushetia 
 Ingushetia is the smallest republic in the North Caucasus, both geographically and in 
population (HRW, 2008).  An assessment of the spillover effect in Ingushetia is inevitably more 
complicated due to the fact that, among the republics of the North Caucasus, Ingushetia shares 
the closest relationship with Chechnya.   The shared history of the two republics does not 
directly contribute to spillover of insurgent violence.  Although the insurgency in Ingushetia can 
trace their origins to Chechnya, the violence within Ingushetia did not begin to dramatically rise 
until 2004 according to Table 1 and the violence did not spike in the republic until the end of the 
decade, in 2007 and 2008 (Table 1 and Table 9).   The data underscores the importance of other 
structural factors within Ingushetia that are removed from events in Chechnya, which fostered an 
insurgency movement.   
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 The Ingush insurgency, or the Ingush jamaat, can locate their organizational genesis in 
the first Chechen conflict (Vatchagaev, 2007c).  The original jamaat was comprised of ethnic 
Ingush living within the city of Grozny during the first assaults of 1994, and their movement did 
not cross into the Republic of Ingushetia until the assault on Grozny in 1999 (2007c). The jamaat 
carried out very few operations in Ingushetia during and after the second conflict in Chechnya.  
Fast-forward to the present and scholars will note that the security situation in Ingushetia has 
only deteriorated, but this deterioration has coincided with the other numerous problems the 
republic faces. 
 Ingushetia, when compared to the neighboring republics, has the worst economic climate.  
The economy grew subtly in consumer expenditures and investments during the 2000s but the 
apparent inequitable distribution of wealth and the staggering unemployment rate remain the 
republic’s two biggest economic obstacles (Table 6).  These are two obstacles that are all to 
common to many of Russia’s republics.  Also, Ingushetia has suffered from these problems since 
the collapse of the Soviet Union and the insurgency only recently became highly active toward 
the end of the 2000s (Table 2; Table 9).  The apparent inactivity of the Ingush jamaat during the 
period immediately following the end of the Chechen conflict leads one to believe that the roots 
of the insurgency are related to other structural factors in the republic.   
 The rise in insurgent violence from 2003 to 2008 coincides with the broader 
political/security situations going on in the republic.  Beginning in 2002, a myriad of political 
reforms swept through Ingushetia effectively limiting political pluralism.  As with Dagestan, a 
policy of recentralization toward Moscow was established and the leaders of the republic were 
supposedly chosen for their “manageability,” a policy which is, historically, not uncommon in 
Russia (The Economist, 2008).  The civilian population eventually began voicing their general 
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dissatisfaction with President Zyazikov but others chose more radical means. During this time 
the security situation within Ingushetia began to disintegrate as the political establishment tried 
to wrangle a growing insurgency.  An increasing number of security operations within the 
republic were believed to be the answer the growing threat.  However, as the operations 
continued the number of disappeared and murdered persons began to rise at an alarming rate 
(www.mashr.org). Quite possibly, these operations, coupled with the republics deplorable 
economic conditions, compelled the youth of Ingushetia to join the radical jamaats (BBC, 2005; 
Kalinina, 2009; KavkazCenter, 2007b).   
 As an example of this radicalization, the insurgents that comprise the increasing attacks 
are primarily youthful Ingush, intermixed with other ethnicities from the republic (Vatchagaev, 
2007c). The insurgency has transcended ethnic and kinship ties within the republic by utilizing 
the increasing marginalization of the youth.  Thus, the Ingush jamaat remained a separate entity 
from the Chechen resistance because of this and they were rather considered just a single 
component of the greater “Caucasian resistance movement,”(2007c).  In fact, in the early 2000s 
the Ingush and Chechen forces coordinated their movements and attacks (2007c).  The most 
famous of which was the Nazran offensive of 2004, led by resistance leader and Chechen, 
Shamil Basaev (HRW, 2008).  The young Ingush men, led by Basaev, targeted “police and 
security facilities in which some 80 people died” (KavkazCenter, 2007a p.1).    
 Though blaming the Chechen conflict, and the Chechen rebels, as the chief instigators for 
the Ingush insurgency is inaccurate.  Thus, added elements such as the Russian and Chechen 
anti-terror/insurgency operations, the unbalanced political affairs of the republic and poor 
economic conditions of the republic have created the conditions conducive for militant actions.  
Chechnya, Dagestan and Ingushetia, sharing many of the same structural faults, have only 
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appeared to develop insurgencies in conjunction, but the more likely explanation is that their 
structural similarities have helped foster insurgency movements with analogous goals.   
Conclusion 
Summary 
 Given the increasing number of insurgent attacks within the Northern Caucasus and the 
declaration of the Caucasus Emirate by insurgent leaders, the purpose of this study was to 
identify an association of factors for the increase in insurgent violence in the Northern Caucasus 
(KavkazCenter, 2007e).  More specifically, a case study of Ingushetia and Dagestan was used to 
discover underlying factors that bred the conditions for the developing insurgencies. The 
economic atmosphere, political repression, ethnic connections and the spillover of conflict within 
the two republics were tested to assess their impact on growing insurgent violence.  
 The study was structured to develop a comparative narrative between Ingushetia and 
Dagestan.  The analysis of these factors sought to establish a relationship with the growing 
insurgent violence in the republics.  This study indicates that the insurgency movements gripping 
the republics have occurred because of a combination of factors.  However, each factor has 
affected the republics in a different way, both in severity and timing, so that the origins of the 
insurgencies of Dagestan and Ingushetia are unique to each republic. 
Implications and Discussion 
 Insurgent attacks plague the Russian Federation and continue to persist after the two 
Chechen conflicts subsided, leading to inquiry about why insurgent violence was occurring in 
Ingushetia and Dagestan, which are removed from the previous conflict zone, with relative 
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frequency and lethality.  Journalists and scholars continually stated that the attacks were caused 
by the increasing destabilization of the entire Northern Caucasus.  The majority of the research 
on the subject focuses on the impact of Chechnya on the neighboring republics, with limited 
inclusion of the societal conditions within the republics.  This research developed an 
interdisciplinary approach to identify an association behind the insurgent violence and 
economics, politics, ethnicity studies and conflict.  
 An examination of the insurgencies within each republic revealed subtle differences as to 
the origin and the context of their apparent proliferation.  In examining the economic situation of 
both republics, the economic section provides strong support for the proposed hypothesis.  The 
analysis relied on the yearly statistical rates for unemployment, average wage increases and the 
estimated level of societal involvement in the black economy. Also, the study focused on the 
economic conditions from 2001-2008, but there is no information to indicate that the republics’ 
economic situations were better prior to the outbreak of hostilities in Chechnya.  Inside the 
Russian Federation, Ingushetia and Dagestan are two of the most economically disadvantaged 
republics, although, Ingushetia is by far the most disadvantaged due to a fluctuating 
unemployment rate and the decreasing average income rate toward the end of the decade.  In 
comparison, Dagestan has experienced levels of growth, though slow, in the employment sector 
coupled with comparatively higher rates of income.   
 The comparison of economic statistics reveals that Dagestan and Ingushetia each have a 
serious problem.  These economic conditions do little to support the youthful population and 
further push them to search for other sources of support and stability.  Much emphasis is placed 
on the black economy within the republics, but evaluating levels economic activity in this sector 
is difficult, though the black market is considered a source of income for the economically 
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disadvantaged.  Insurgent groups in the republics are known to kidnap individuals and demand 
ransom (State Department, 2002-2009), but little definitive evidence exists that supports greed as 
a motivation for militant actions. 
 Instead, this analysis identifies that an inverse relationship exists between economic 
opportunities (employment)/advantages (income) and the spread of insurgent violence.  The 
spread of the violence should be considered more accurately as a spread of insurgent recruitment 
through the economic disenfranchisement.  Through higher recruitment, the insurgencies are able 
to conduct a broader scale of operations throughout the Caucasus and into Russia proper.  In 
attempts to control this disenfranchisement, the Kremlin has subsidized large portions of the 
republics’ populations and government institutions. Indeed, when the global economic crisis hit 
Russia, the Kremlin was forced to cut the republics of the Northern Caucasus budgets by nearly 
20% according to the KavkazCenter (2009).  An increase in military forces was implemented 
during the same time, indicating the preparation of potential conflicts resulting from the decrease 
in local funding (2009). 
 The effect of political repression is also disproportionate in the republics, with Ingushetia 
facing the highest level of political restrictiveness or at least the greatest impact on the society.  
Besides the obvious economic disappointments over which President Zyazikov resided, the 
increasing restrictiveness of political discourse has effectively galvanized the population to resist 
Russian influences, their supported leaders and security services.  The Ingushetian security 
services further exacerbate the situation by employing tactics that have led to the disappearance, 
and apparent deaths, of many civilians.  The youth of the republic are particularly susceptible to 
this atmosphere of fear.  In this regard, Dagestan has suffered a similar fate to Ingushetia. 
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 In Dagestan, the electoral processes of both judicial and political services were dictated 
from Moscow.  Electoral freedoms are restricted within Dagestan, but the main concern of the 
Dagestani public is the increase in disappearances, abductions and deaths apparently made by 
security services similar to Ingushetia (reports indicate both Russian Federal troops and 
Ingushetian internal forces).   Societal abuses perpetrated by the security services possess a 
deeply polarizing effect on the populations of both Ingushetia and Dagestan.   
 Compared to Russia as a whole, the two republics suffered from extreme political 
repression, but the most notable difference is the application of controlled (or out of control) 
violence directed against the population.  Thus, according to the research, the issue of restricted 
electoral freedom, as a grievance, cannot be considered as a leading factor for the spread of 
insurgent violence.  Rather, the use of violent and repressive tactics by the security services and 
the government have created conditions for an ongoing conflict with the people of Dagestan and 
Ingushetia, irrespective of perceived ethnic divisions.   
 The populations of Ingushetia and Dagestan are markedly different with their ethnic 
makeup.  Ingushetia is a fairly homogenous republic in comparison to the multiethnic Dagestan; 
thus the two republics disprove the claim that ethnicity has an impact on spreading insurgent 
violence.  The multiethnic composition of Dagestan has forced each ethnicity within to cooperate 
for the collective good.  The ethnic makeup of each republic and the resulting insurgencies do 
not share any definitive link.  The jamaats are intermixed with ethnicities from the entire North 
Caucasus, suggesting that other unifying factors are at work.   
 The Dagestani and Ingush jamaats have evolved out of what appears to be separate 
ideological and radically religious divides among the populations fueled by social abuses and 
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economic stagnation.  Furthermore, each group may intermingle with the surrounding 
organizations through tacit or explicit arrangements, but the insurgencies of each republic 
maintain a relatively close relationship with the territory, in which they reside, representing a 
portion of the greater “Caucasian resistance” from foreign (Russian) domination, or so they 
claim.  Undoubtedly, the situation in Ingushetia is the most extreme, with the insurgency 
possessing freedom of movement and relative acceptance from the populace (Vatchagaev 
2009b).  As a result, insurgents maintain a form of authoritative legitimacy in the republic, unlike 
the Dagestani jamaat.  As a result, the Ingush jamaat conducts some of the most aggressive 
operations. 
 Finally, many scholars profess that a spillover from conflict in Chechnya caused the 
spreading insurgencies.  The case study gives mixed support for this hypothesis.  The two 
republics already had existing radical or militant elements within the republics prior to the 
outbreak of the second Chechen conflict.  The fact that the spread of the insurgencies occurred 
three years after the fall of Grozny is very telling.  The second Chechen conflict, and, more 
specifically the rebel’s participation in the conflict, did not directly attribute to the spillover that 
is indicated in scholarly and journalistic accounts. 
 The elements of the Chechen conflict that truly spilled over into the neighboring 
republics occurred primarily in the form of antiterrorism and anti-insurgency operations.  The 
operations occurred at the end of large-scale combat operations in Chechnya and continued to 
spread into the interiors of the neighboring republics.  Indeed, portions of the resistance fled into 
the neighboring republics, but in the process of pursuing the insurgents, the security services 
alienated the citizens of the republics.  Both Ingushetian and Dagestani insurgent groups 
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had/have differing ideological and religious motives for engaging in militant operations but are 
united in their struggle against the Russian Federation and the regimes supporting the Kremlin.   
 The rise and spread of the insurgent violence is the result of a combination of factors.  
The implications for the findings of each section show the complex mixture these factors 
emanating from the republic, regional and federal levels.  The insurgencies of Ingushetia and 
Dagestan would not have occurred without some combination of both economic decline and 
political repression.  However, these two elements alone would not have created conditions for 
the insurgency to blossom.  In addition, the inclusion of supplementary stressors such as the 
inclusion of federal and internal ministry forces executing antiterrorism and anti-insurgency 
operations estranged an already downtrodden public, contributing to the proliferation of the 
insurgencies. 
Limitations 
 The study of insurgent violence in the Northern Caucasus is an extremely challenging 
topic with many components to study, necessitating an interdisciplinary approach that 
incorporates both established scholarly research and the facts surrounding the topic of insurgent 
violence within Ingushetia and Dagestan.  The study attempted to explain the spreading insurgent 
violence, but holes still remain within the research that deserve closer scrutiny.   
 The study employed a variety of disciplines, including economics, political science, 
ethnographic studies and conflict studies. Interdisciplinary studies are complicated due to the 
mixture of disciplines and the significant amount of crossover among some of the topics.   This 
research tried to emphasize this crossover to present a more holistic portrayal of the events 
 
 
63 
taking place in the two republics, but more detailed analysis of anyone of these disciplines could 
yield new knowledge. 
 Also, identifying accurate data was difficult for two reasons.  The first reason is that the 
material gathered for the research had to be evaluated for reliability.  Information coming from 
either the Russian Federation or insurgent websites is inherently subject to biases beyond the 
control of this researcher.  On the same note, conflicting reports as to the severity of attacks, 
economic statistics and restrictiveness of political structures were a continuing battle throughout 
the research.   
 The second reason is that this research did not include many Russian language documents 
limiting the choices of materials.  As many Russian language sources were excluded, Western 
bias on the subject matter was continual throughout the study.  However, the materials outside of 
the Russian Federation, including NGOs and journalistic accounts were credible, perhaps more 
so than potentially inaccurate reports from the Russian Federation, which has already been 
discussed. 
Suggestions for Future Research 
 This research suggests many implications for future study and contributes to scholarly 
knowledge in multiple disciplines including political science, military history, peace and conflict 
studies, economics and ethnicity studies.  Furthermore, the case study will benefit government 
agencies and NGOs by assisting in the development of future policies.  Conclusions drawn in 
this study stated that a strong correlation exists between the failing economies of Ingushetia and 
Dagestan and their politically repressed societies.  Further studies need to assist in the 
confirmation that a relationship between the two does exist. However, further research also needs 
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to evaluate the conclusion that added aggravating factors (i.e. armed action by the state) led to 
the development of an insurgency.  
 Also, this study lightly addressed the effects of religion, ideology and nationalism on the 
insurgencies in the Northern Caucasus.  In the material, the insurgents appear to differ in their 
conceptualization of success and their motivations for resisting the Russian Federation.  The 
majority of materials emphasize the reports of leading members of the insurgency instead of the 
low level fighters.  Understanding their motivations would lead to better federal and republic-
based policies on youth and community dynamics in Ingushetia and Dagestan, as well as the 
Northern Caucasus region as a whole. 
 This research also possesses implications for the future security of the Russian 
Federation.  Some believe Russia’s problems in the North Caucasus are isolated and the events 
of the region have no resemblance to other regions.  This is true, however, political corruption is 
noted as a major problem within the country as a whole and the global financial crisis dealt a 
severe blow to Russia’s economy.  Research opportunities exist in examining the relationship 
between the economic and political conditions on Russia’s other peripheries to assess their 
variable impact on the populations residing within. 
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